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property rights, citizenship, corruption, 
and inequality
confiscating loyalist estates during 
the american revolution
abstract:  In Maryland, fierce debate attended the decision to confiscate loyal-
ist lands, but the state eventually embraced confiscation, seizing significantly more 
loyalist land than neighbors who had access to lands in the trans-Appalachian west. 
State senators who initially objected to property confiscations found themselves 
forced by necessity to adopt a revolutionary view of subjecthood, in which loyal-
ists who abandoned the state voluntarily abrogated their citizenship. While some 
irregularity surrounded Maryland’s confiscations, this paled in comparison to the 
corruption that attended confiscation in neighboring states like Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey. However, as in other confiscations, the state’s political and military offic-
ers came to dominate purchases of loyalist land, demonstrating the influence of the 
wealthy over Maryland’s political process.
keywords:  Confiscation, land speculation, revolution, property rights, loyalists
In 1777, with the American Revolutionary War in the balance, the Continental 
Congress suggested confiscating loyalist property as a means of raising 
money. Although it left the final decision for this measure to the discretion 
of the rebelling states, all thirteen passed confiscation legislation targeting 
active loyalists who abandoned the state or fought against the patriots. States 
varied widely in the amount of land they confiscated. Confiscation met little 
real political opposition in Pennsylvania, where the state sold around 40,000 
acres of loyalist land beginning in 1778. The state also assumed control over 
more than 20 million acres of the Penn family’s proprietary lands, for which 
it granted £130,000 in compensation (perhaps a tenth of its true value). 
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In Maryland, one of the last states to enact confiscation, the issue became a 
political flashpoint, exacerbating pre-existing tensions between politicians in 
the House of Delegates who supported confiscation and those in the Senate 
who opposed it. Despite starting confiscations as late as 1781, Maryland even-
tually confiscated more land than Pennsylvania, selling over 200,000 acres 
and gaining £450,000 from auctions. Maryland also assumed control over its 
proprietor’s inheritance, compensating Henry Harford with £10,000, while 
selling his quarter-million acres for nearly £200,000. This put the scale of 
confiscations for the relatively small state of Maryland almost on par with 
the much larger state of New York, which seized and sold 1 million acres of 
loyalist lands.1
The states’ auctions of confiscated property took place within the broader 
context of a continent gripped by land mania. Even before the Revolution, 
the logic of land investment was plain. In the 1750s Benjamin Franklin 
expressed this understanding well when he wrote that land was “plenty in 
America, and so cheap as that a laboring Man, that understands Husbandry, 
can in a short Time save Money enough to purchase a Piece of new Land suf-
ficient for a Plantation, whereon he may subsist a Family.” These conditions 
allowed for early marriages, allowing Franklin to estimate that the colonial 
population “must at least be doubled every 20 years.” Despite this burgeon-
ing populace, “so vast is the Territory of North-America, that it will require 
many Ages to settle it fully; and till it is fully settled, Labour will never be 
cheap here.” As a result, Franklin noted that America could never compete 
with England in the production of manufactured goods. Franklin did not 
directly spell out the implications for investing wealth in America, but we 
can do so: compared to Europe, America’s population density was low, but 
the population itself was growing. Therefore, land that was currently cheap 
due to a lack of demand would become dear at some point in the future. It 
is no accident that Franklin became an avid land speculator, as did most of 
his wealthy contemporaries.2
The French and Indian War briefly complicated the logic of America’s 
land market. The end of the war eradicated French opposition on the conti-
nent, which could have signaled an open frontier for the British. Instead the 
government enacted the Proclamation Line in 1763, banning white migra-
tion west of the Appalachians to prevent further violence with Indians. Sir 
William Johnson renegotiated the line further to the west at the Treaty of 
Fort Stanwix in 1768, but the general limitation on western settlement—and 
therefore western land speculation—remained. Thus, for the decade leading 
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up to the revolution, land east of the Appalachians became more densely 
populated, without the ability to release potential migrants to the west.3
The outbreak of the American Revolution changed this dynamic for the 
continental land market. The victorious revolutionaries had no qualms about 
taking Indian lands and opening the west to settlement, causing a boom in 
land speculation to follow on the heels of the war. While the United States 
government negotiated with individual states for the rights to the far west, 
states like Pennsylvania, New York, and North Carolina sold off much of 
their backcountries to speculators. Some speculators, like William Cooper, 
amassed great fortunes; others, like Robert Morris and John Nicholson, made 
and then lost fortunes, dealing in millions of acres to their own detriment. 
For the United States and the financially stretched American states, selling 
land in the west held open one of the only real possibilities for avoiding 
bankruptcy after a lengthy and very costly war of independence.4
The vast amount of land that entered the market in the aftermath of the 
American Revolution offered an opportunity to level social differences, albeit 
one that the United States did not pursue. Some, like Thomas Jefferson, 
recognized this opportunity and advocated for widespread landownership 
as a precondition for a healthy republic, arguing that “dependance begets 
subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares 
fit tools for the designs of ambition.” Nevertheless, government policies 
favored speculators for decades following the revolution, in part due to the 
dire need for ready cash. By 1785 the grand speculator George Washington 
worried about “Land jobbers” west of the Appalachians “prouling about 
like Wolves . . . [injuring] the real occupants & useful citizens; & conse-
quently, the public interest.” By 1789 Virginia’s exasperated attorney general 
James Innes wrote, “If Congress think speculators, and land jobbers, of 
more de[se]rving favor and reward—than the officers of the late American 
Army—be it so—our interests must, I suppose, be yielded.” While Franklin’s 
calculations that American land should be cheap held true in the aggregate, 
tenancy remained commonplace in many regions. For example, in 1783 half 
of the white householders living in Maryland’s Chesapeake counties did not 
own their own land and tenancy was common even in the less developed 
western portions of the state. Areas that had been devoid of white settlement 
prior to the revolution, such as Ohio, could theoretically have seen the wide-
spread distribution of small independent farms. Instead, by 1810 a minority 
of the adult male inhabitants owned land, and speculators controlled the 
majority of the state’s acres.5
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It is within this larger context of governmental indebtedness and support 
for the ambitions of speculators that this article will examine the process 
of confiscating British property in Maryland and compare it to the con-
fiscations in Pennsylvania and other nearby states. Like their neighbors, 
Marylanders expressed varying levels of uneasiness with the idea of property 
confiscation. They debated what confiscation meant for the nature of citi-
zenship and property rights and they worried about the opportunities that 
confiscations would provide for unscrupulous war profiteers. Maryland was 
slow to endorse confiscation and quick to ban bills of attainder after the war, 
but nevertheless acquired a great deal of loyalist land in the final years of 
the revolution. In the end, after Maryland embraced confiscation as a war-
time expedient, the primary beneficiaries were the men with the wealth to 
purchase lands. This class of men included some merchants but contained a 
disproportionately large number of the state’s political and military officers. 
The debates over confiscation and the unequal distribution of confiscated 
lands thus offer a window into revolutionary society, demonstrating how 
American elites directed the politics of the country in ways that benefited the 
existing landholding class.6
laying the groundwork for confiscation
The American Revolution posed a complicated problem for local elites 
throughout the new states. Leaders of the insurrection had to negotiate an 
intricate political balance: on one hand, the revolution had to capture the 
hearts and minds of the common people, which involved ensuring that they 
had political and financial incentives to rebel against British rule. On the 
other, revolutionary elites wanted to avoid anarchy and mob rule. Keeping 
this balance in mind, Maryland produced a conservative state constitution. 
As late as January 1776, the Maryland Convention adopted a statement 
embracing the English constitution and the king. However, following the 
Declaration of Independence that summer, an electoral struggle ensued 
between two factions for control of the Maryland conventions that would 
establish a new constitution. Led by Rezin Hammond, the radicals had been 
early advocates for independence and had pressed for violent opposition 
to British taxation as early as 1774. Aiming for the support of the humble 
he called for all taxpayers to vote, regardless of income, for a ban on debt 
collection until the end of the military conflict and the restructuring of tax 
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collection to be more equitable across all classes. Opposing Hammond was 
the peculiarly elitist “popular party,” a more moderate group led by the 
wealthy Carroll family and the Annapolis lawyer Samuel Chase. The split 
between the two factions developed partially out of personal disagreements 
between the Hammonds and Carrolls, who opposed one another in court 
battles over the legal title to several hundred acres of land.7
Once at the conventions, the popular party leveraged the threat of loyal-
ist insurrections on the Eastern Shore to call for compromise and patriotic 
unity. A raft of changes loosened colonial restrictions on voting but kept 
power in the hands of elites. To vote, Maryland’s citizens needed to pos-
sess £30 in paper money (equivalent to £20 sterling) or fifty acres of land. 
They could not directly vote for the state senators of the upper house, but 
instead only chose a body of electors who decided the composition of the 
Senate. Similarly, the elected legislators of both the lower and upper houses 
of the legislature chose the governor. Strict property requirements still pre-
vented common planters from serving in positions of power: the governor 
required £5,000; members of the Senate needed £1,000; members of the 
House required £500. To put these numbers in some perspective, Jackson 
Turner Main suggested that a typical 289-acre farm on the Eastern Shore in 
the late colonial period could only yield £170 per year. This meant that only 
substantial planters owning about 1,000 acres could qualify for office under 
Maryland’s revolutionary constitution.8
Far from revolutionizing the social structure, these new property require-
ments recreated a social basis for the government that resembled that of the 
colonial period. Charles Barker calculated that in 1755, while the average 
landholder owned between 255 and 473 acres, the average lower house del-
egate held 2,222 acres, and the average upper house delegate held 8,422 acres. 
The numbers for delegates’ holdings did not shift significantly in 1771. Over 
this same period, David Skaggs surveyed four counties across the colony, 
finding the percentage of total landholders in these counties dropped from 
44 to 37 percent.9
As a result, while 63.8 percent of white men in Maryland could vote, 
access to political office depended on the county. In wealthy Baltimore 
County, 27.5 percent of white men met the property requirements to become 
legislators. In westernmost Washington County, only 6.2 percent met those 
property requirements, and fewer than 2 percent owned enough property to 
become senators. As had been the case in Maryland’s colonial period, legisla-
tors in the lower house tended to possess more than five times the amount of 
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property of the average voter in their district; legislators in the upper house 
tended to own between twenty and thirty times as much property as the aver-
age voter in their district. This left so few men eligible for the Senate that in 
the words of Senator Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, “there will not be men 
enough found of sufficient abilities to turn the machine with that velocity 
which the present exigencys of our affairs require.” He feared that such an 
unrepresentative institution could cause the people to balk whenever the 
indirectly elected Senate differed in opinion from the House.10
In 1777, with control of the government vested firmly in the hands of the 
wealthy, the popular party next dealt with the fiscal crises menacing the state: 
farmers’ debts to merchants and the costly ongoing war effort. The popular 
party appeased many voters by passing compromise measures that echoed 
Hammond’s proposals. First, the legislature reformed the tax system, abolish-
ing the split colonial system that instituted land and poll taxes in favor of a 
graduated property tax. Between 1777 and 1781 the government passed ten 
different laws to regulate taxation. These laws attempted to grade the quality 
of land, land improvements, and slaves in order to shift a greater tax burden 
on the wealthy, but also expanded the tax base to include those who had 
previously been considered propertyless.11
Additionally, in 1777 the legislature passed several controversial bills 
creating a cheap supply of money. The state printed money to pay its own 
debts and allowed Marylanders to pay their taxes in paper money. These 
measures temporarily eased the financial difficulties of both the state and 
its people. Importantly, the state also mandated that the money printed by 
Maryland and the United States must be accepted as legal tender by credi-
tors. This money quickly depreciated, easing the lot of debtors across the 
state, strengthening support for the government, and appeasing the com-
mon people. The measure obviously hurt elite creditors. Wealthy men began 
to feel a sense of foreboding about potential social conflict ignited by the 
future effects of inflation, and a rift began to open between the Senate and 
the House over the state’s financial profligacy. Ultimately, the debate over 
confiscation only worsened the split.12
In part, this was because Maryland experienced relatively little open dis-
sent from loyalists during the Revolutionary War. Indeed, the Western Shore 
never saw organized loyalist forces. However, hundreds of loyalists organized 
on the Eastern Shore in 1777 and 1778, timing their violence to coincide with 
the British campaign against Philadelphia. These forces could not match the 
more numerous Maryland patriots, and many loyalists lapsed into neutrality 
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after the British withdrawal from Philadelphia. In response to this loyalist 
activity, the Maryland legislature demanded an oath of loyalty in 1777, bar-
ring anyone who refused to take the oath from serving in the government 
and assessing trebled tax rates upon them. Only 18,000 people, or roughly 
two-thirds of the eligible adult male population, swore an oath of allegiance 
to the revolution. The government made no effort to single out recalcitrant 
but inactive Tories for punishments beyond special taxes. Unfortunately for 
Maryland’s loyalists, however, Britain made little effort to support them: 
their regular soldiers spent virtually no time in Maryland throughout the 
war and Maryland’s loyalists proved no match for the more numerous patriot 
militia. As a result, even on the Eastern Shore, most Maryland loyalists lapsed 
into a grudging neutrality, with outbreaks of violence occurring only sporadi-
cally throughout the war.13
Given the lack of British military support, it remains an open question 
as to why some Marylanders remained loyal to the crown. Robert Calhoon 
suggested that personal ties played a large role in determining whether 
Americans remained loyal during the conflict: of the 136 Maryland colonial 
officeholders whose allegiance can be determined, two-thirds joined the 
revolutionaries. Yet officeholders were three times as likely to remain loyal-
ists than to become patriots if they had received their patronage directly 
from one of the colonial governors or through the influence of one of the 
major proprietary party families: the Dulanys, the Calverts, or the Claggetts. 
Officeholders who had not received personal patronage from these propri-
etary officials became revolutionaries in overwhelming numbers. On the 
Eastern Shore, the rise of evangelical religion, especially Methodism, among 
the common people exacerbated a breakdown in social cohesion between 
classes. This left the door open for loyalist dissenters. However, by mid-war, 
the popular party’s compromise policies had undermined the resentment 
between classes, preventing this movement from spreading.14
passing confiscation legislation
In Rhode Island the confiscation of loyalist estates began as early as October 
1775. By November 1777 North Carolina, New York, and Massachusetts had 
followed suit, and Congress formally suggested that all states begin confiscat-
ing British property. In Maryland the dominant figures of the popular party, 
Samuel Chase in the House of Delegates and Charles Carroll of Carrollton in 
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the Senate, blocked any discussion of confiscation for two years. Only South 
Carolina would wait longer than Maryland to eventually pass confiscation 
legislation.15
By late 1779 the House of Delegates and the Senate had developed oppos-
ing views about Maryland’s financial situation. Many senators believed 
that the state had already gone too far to weaken its currency and thereby 
threatened property holding in general. Members of the House worried 
that the state could no longer fight the war effort without an influx of cash. 
For the year 1780, Congress asked Maryland to provide more than $14 mil-
lion, with the first installment of more than $1.5 million due in February. 
The House believed that taxation alone could not raise the money without 
impoverishing the populace. As a result, on December 15, 1779, they passed 
a bill seizing British estates, estimating that their sales would raise more than 
$5 million.16
The Senate rejected the bill five days later, and over the next year the ques-
tion of confiscation became the most significant debate in Maryland politics. 
Carroll drafted the Senate’s initial explanation for its rejection of the bill, 
which set the terms of the debate that would follow. Severe weather meant 
that half of the senators had already left for the winter, so Carroll asked for 
a postponement of the matter, bolstering this delaying effort with a list of 
objections to the bill.17
In terms of practical matters, the House had argued that paying its 
share of the war effort through taxation alone would result in the people of 
Maryland being stripped of 27 percent of their property by the end of 1780. 
Carroll disagreed because of the rapid advance of inflation. Depreciation of 
the dollar would render the nominal value of all property much higher, so 
that people would be able to continue to pay so long as they had tangible 
resources. Therefore, the Senate believed fiscal collapse was not imminent, 
and that confiscation could therefore be postponed.18
Carroll had further practical objections to confiscation. If the House 
wanted to confiscate British property immediately, they would be putting 
lands up for sale at the worst time of year, when the winter would impede 
buyers from attending auctions. Instead, he predicted that the purchas-
ers would “consist altogether of engrossers and speculators, men who have 
acquired great sums for little value, and therefore may afford to run the risk, 
whatever it may be, of realizing their money on such easy terms.” Combined 
with the ravages of depreciation, “the sum arising from the sales would, we 
think, for the reasons already suggested, be very inconsiderable, and far short 
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of the real value of the property sold.” Such sales would become a liability if 
the United States were to negotiate peace in 1780, because Carroll assumed 
that part of that negotiation would require a repayment of the value of con-
fiscated British property.19
Practical matters, however, took secondary importance to the Senate’s 
main argument: that Maryland’s constitution forbade confiscation. In 
Carroll’s words, “We doubt, whether, by a fair construction of that law [of 
nations], the declaration of independence can have such a retrospective 
operation, as to vest in this state all British property acquired by individuals 
antecedently to it.” Indeed, if British absentees forfeited not only their prop-
erty, but also their subjecthood to the state when they left, the state’s treason 
laws targeting the same people made little sense; how could someone who 
was not a subject of Maryland commit treason? Even if there were a consti-
tutional defense to be made for confiscation, “intemperate zeal and intem-
perate resentments have frequently given fatal stabs to governments as free 
as ours. We need not remind you that the rigour of law is often injustice.” 
While the Senate’s desire to avoid injustice for British absentees seemed 
high-minded and generous, it may not have been selfless. Carroll and other 
elite men in the state had significant capital that remained in Britain, tied 
up in banks and property. Privately Carroll worried that should the state 
confiscate British property, the British would retaliate against Marylanders. 
This made it especially important for the wealthy to protect property rights 
at all costs.20
Of course, something had to be done to continue the war, and the Senate 
agreed that Maryland had its back against the wall financially. Carroll wrote 
that the ultimate financial solution lay outside of Maryland:
When the representatives of the United States perceive the impracti-
cability of supporting the war by taxes, and internal loans, only, neces-
sity will force them to adopt a measure, which justice and true policy 
dictate, and which had been ere now adopted, if partial interests had 
not interfered, and prevented its adoption. By making the back lands 
a common stock, and by selling a part of them, millions might in 
time be brought into the public treasury, and in the mean while great 
sums would probably be advanced on that security; monies may be 
borrowed in Europe, and of this we suppose the congress have assur-
ances, by the late notice of their intention to draw bills of exchange 
to the amount of £200,000 sterling.
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In Carroll’s reasoning, if Maryland could avoid being too hasty, the other 
states would eventually come to their senses and make an agreement on 
selling the lands west of the Appalachians. This communal revenue source 
would solve the country’s problems without hamstringing Maryland’s future 
or threatening the sanctity of property rights. In the meantime, he wrote, “we 
are persuaded we shall never receive [the people’s] thanks, if, endeavouring 
by expedients to shun small and temporary inconveniences, we bring upon 
them much greater future evils.”21
On December 30, 1779, the House of Delegates responded to the Senate’s 
missive in frustration, engaging in a point-by-point refutation of Carroll’s 
message. They noted the direness of the situation and extensively defended 
the righteousness of confiscation, according to natural law and the law of 
nations. They doubted that the British would demand compensation for 
the confiscated property. With regards to the Senate’s fears that speculators 
would snap up most of the property, the House wrote:
We do not think it probable that this will be the case. The objects of 
these men are the necessaries of life, and the commodities of foreign 
commerce; but, if they should be the purchasers, we cannot help 
believing, that it will be desirable; for thereby the money, which is 
the means of their speculation, will be drawn out of their hands; and 
if, as your honours seem to suppose, “the title may be doubtful, and 
the purchase invidious,” engrossers and speculators are the best men 
whose hands it can fall into.
The House took a similar sarcastic tone when addressing the idea that 
sales of backcountry land could rescue the financial situation. Initially 
agreeing with the proposal, the author of the House’s document went on 
to opine that:
the back lands cannot be confiscated. If they belong to the native 
Indians, your honours will say, that though they have made war 
against us, yet their property cannot be confiscated, for Vattell, a late 
and celebrated writer on the law of nations, has shewn, “that the rig-
our of that law is much softened in this very point, by present usage 
and practice.” If they belong to the crown of Great Britain, as trustee 
for the nation, as we conceive, and will be called British property, 
the congress, should they adopt the same way of thinking with your 
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honours, will not be willing to confiscate it, as it may be made a 
preliminary article of the peace, that it be secured, or at least the full 
value of it, to the original owners.
Thus, with the battle lines between the two sides drawn by the House’s 
mockery, the Senate adjourned for the winter, allowing the debate between 
pro- and anti-confiscation ideologues to take place in the weekly Maryland 
Gazette.22
Again, Charles Carroll of Carrollton set the stage for the initial debate, 
writing in the Gazette as “A Senator” in the editions of February 11 and 18. 
He picked up where he left off, arguing that the plan for confiscation was 
murky and unlikely to enrich the state, especially if speculators could lock in 
a price for purchase at auction but withhold actual payment while the coun-
try’s money depreciated in value. He also argued against the constitutionality 
of property confiscation. For example, he appealed to the legal scholars 
Grotius, Vattell, and others who argued that wars between nations allow for 
the confiscation of another nation’s collective property, but not the individual 
property of the opponent’s subjects, especially when those individuals had 
committed no crimes. Carroll believed that the question of whether the 
British were aliens had to be determined by the courts and not the legislature. 
He inverted the logic of the famous Calvin’s Case, which held that Scottish 
subjects born before the union with England remained aliens in England 
after the union. In Maryland, therefore, because all were born British subjects 
before Maryland’s independence, the British could not be made retroactive 
aliens of the state after independence.23
The February 18 issue of the Gazette featured a letter supporting 
Carroll. In the next week’s paper, “A Delegate” quipped, “The Senator 
having occupied the Press, it will be impossible to answer him, until it 
shall be vacant for that purpose. The public in the meantime will suspend 
their judgment.” By late February, however, the tide already began to 
turn. Multipage letters to the editor in support of confiscation began to 
populate the Gazette’s pages. From February 11 to May 12, discussion of 
confiscation dominated the newspaper, ultimately resulting in eighteen 
letters supporting confiscation, nine opposing confiscation, and another 
nine addressing confiscation without clearly supporting or supposing it, 
either by reporting on political proceedings, or worrying about the tenor 
of debate in the state. The topic’s popularity was such that several wags 
published satirical pieces lampooning the debate itself and one another 
without making serious points.24
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It is hard to reconstruct popular opinion from these pieces in the Gazette. 
We cannot get a grasp on the authors of the debates: they themselves spent a 
considerable amount of time questioning who was really writing. For exam-
ple, it seems clear that at least three different authors wrote under the pseu-
donym of “A Plebean,” and those authors did not agree with one another on 
all points. It could well be that the authors of the various letters represented 
marginal opinions that the broad population did not share. However, the 
large number of pieces supporting confiscation should give some indica-
tion that it had a significant base of support among the Gazette’s educated 
readership. The tone of the letters in response to Carroll can also give a sense 
of how common Marylanders felt about his reasoning. An early response to 
Carroll expressed a sense of revolutionary outrage:
It is justly alarming to see principles like the Senator’s spread in a free 
country, when two years ago, if any man had talked in that manner, 
he would as soon have dared to put himself in the fire, or be tarred 
and feathered, especially a member of our assembly; Good God, What 
is this state come to, to be subjects of Great Britain? And we cannot 
take the property of our enemies to pay our taxes, when, if it was in 
their power they would take our lives.
Another author, aiming to recapitulate Carroll’s points in plain English, 
wrote that the senator believed that “war may be carried on without money.” 
A third, with Carroll’s discussion of Calvin’s Case in mind and referring to 
the additional taxes that the state forced avowed loyalists to pay, wrote that 
“the Senator has fully proved, that we are still British subjects. How then, 
consistent with a good conscience, could any one take the oath of allegiance 
to the state? On this ground the Senator may go on to show the iniquity of 
the treble tax law.” A fourth satirist wrote:
Much scoff and scorn has been cast on a position of the Senator, that 
a man may owe allegiance to two countries; and yet we hear of a snake 
in New-England (according to the account of Cotton Mather, to the 
royal society) which had two heads, and could run two ways at a time; 
also of a negro in this state (according to the account of a gentleman, 
to the same body) which was white and black, by turns; that is (not a 
pye-bald negro, but) one who was white, one season of the year, and 
black the other. Is it more extraordinary, that a man should be the 
subject of two countries and inherit in both?
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Satire such as this can give us some insight into the common man’s resent-
ments: of the British, of attempts to lighten the burden on public enemies 
while the people suffered, and of the elite Senate’s interest in legal niceties 
and shades of gray during a national emergency.25
In April 1780, with the message to the Senate that “our affairs are brought 
to an alarming crisis,” the House of Delegates renewed its push for a confis-
cations bill. This bill was relatively straightforward, reiterating an argument 
based on natural law that justified confiscation. The bill also contained a 
provision that banned all quitrents to the British proprietor, Henry Harford. 
The Senate endorsed banning quitrents but rejected the combined bill.26
When the Senate debated, their opposition focused on constitutional mat-
ters. In the words of Charles Carroll of Carrollton, Maryland’s “declaration 
of rights secured all property acquired under the old government.” His father, 
Charles Carroll of Annapolis, summed up the issue: “if British subjects are 
aliens, they can’t hold property in this state; if they are not aliens, it would 
be a breach of the constitution, to take their property from them.” Only 
the courts could decide who was or was not an alien. He pointed out that 
the state had not previously considered the proprietor Henry Harford an 
alien, despite his continued residence in Britain, because they passed laws to 
compensate him for taking his lands. Robert Goldsborough followed up by 
questioning when British subjects lost their attachment to Maryland. What if 
the absentees had left the state before the battles of Lexington and Concord, 
or before the signing of the Declaration of Independence or Maryland’s 
constitution in 1776? He asked, “Did they, by going away, infringe any law? 
Their property was acquired legally; if they infringed no law, when they went 
away, it would be an ex post facto law, and contrary to the declaration of 
rights, to take their property away.” In part, this question revolved around 
what made a citizen: in the words of Thomas Stone: “I don’t understand the 
doctrine of election: what gives an election, but the having property in the 
state?” Maryland as a state existed to protect its property holders, who made 
up the electorate. The constitution elevated property holding such that only 
the wealthiest men could fill the highest ranks of state office. As the senators 
debated the issue, they realized that the act of confiscation amounted to a 
radical redefinition of the citizenry.27
Basing further objections on practicalities, Goldsborough argued, “If we 
cannot carry on the war without British property, our enemies will know it 
and continue the war, and we must soon yield.” The younger Carroll also 
objected on practical grounds, repeating his concern that “the treaty of peace 
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Great-Britain would stipulate for the restoration of the property confiscated, 
or a compensation for it,” such that holding onto any money received from 
British subjects would prove illusory. Senator Thomas Stone considered 
the possibility of confiscation but argued that the process could not be 
conducted with undue haste: “It is time to interpose, not to steal a march 
on them, but to give them notice to come and possess their property, or it 
should be considered as derelict.”28
By this point in the spring of 1780, Stone and the other members of the 
Senate had come to recognize the state’s dire financial position and the con-
sequent need for confiscation, but constitutional questions still dominated 
their thinking on the issue. Focusing on giving due notice to those potentially 
affected, the Senate’s counterproposal mostly mirrored the House’s bill, but 
defined British subjects as those who had left the state after August 14, 1775, 
when Maryland had put itself on a formal defense footing against the British. 
The Senate proposed alerting the nation’s generals and foreign ministers in 
Europe so that they could alert anyone affected to return by May 1, 1781, to 
reclaim Maryland citizenship and retain their property. British minors who 
inherited Maryland estates could return by March 1786 to reclaim their inher-
itance. Seeing these overtures to the enemy as a bridge too far, the House did 
not pass the Senate’s bill, leaving confiscation at an impasse.29
Outside events forced the senators’ hands. Within a few months, it 
became apparent that the Maryland legislature could not draw on provincial 
funds that the colonial legislature had invested for fifteen years, beginning 
in 1764. This money had gone to purchase stocks controlled by the Bank of 
England, which refused to release the investment to Maryland’s state treas-
urer. In addition, in Charleston, South Carolina, the British had begun a 
campaign of arrests and property confiscations targeting local prominent citi-
zens. This amounted to a pattern: British officials had signaled that they did 
not share the Senate’s qualms about confiscation and specifically confiscated 
Maryland’s money. The legislature needed no further debate; the final bill 
for confiscation passed in November 1780. In the preamble the bill’s authors 
included a justification linked explicitly to Britain’s recent actions:
Whereas the subjects of Great-Britain possess considerable landed 
and other property in this state, which the legislature, from a disin-
clination to distress individuals, hath suffered to remain in the hands 
and management of their agents, hoping that a conduct so moderate 
would induce the enemy to respect the rights of humanity, emulate 
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the example, and alleviate the calamities of war; but such lenity and 
forbearance, instead of meeting with a proper return, have been falsely 
imputed to pusillanimity and a dread of retaliation, and seem rather 
to have encouraged the enemy to acts of violence and cruelty.
This passage neatly summarizes the Senate’s about-face: the British com-
pelled them to no longer entertain constitutional arguments or “alleviate the 
calamities of war.”30
For senators who had long grappled with the constitutionality of depriv-
ing anyone of their property, the law amounted to a radical redefinition 
of subjecthood. For the purposes of the law, any man born within British 
dominions was British,
unless he hath, by some subsequent act, divested himself of that rela-
tion, by adhering to us and our cause, as by entering in to the service 
or employment of the United States, or any of them, joining in the 
formation of our government, taking the oath of allegiance to it, with-
drawing himself from the British dominions for his attachment to the 
United States, or by doing some similar open act.
The law took a further step, banning any “payments or remittances what-
soever” to any British person, except for parents educating their children in 
British dominions. They were to continue these payments only for as long as 
it took to relocate the children elsewhere. In April, senators had questioned 
what it meant to be a voter in Maryland, since the main requirement was 
holding property in the state. Now, the residents of Maryland had to prove 
their allegiance to the revolution, or else remain British: passive subjecthood 
would need to give way to active citizenship.31
Nevertheless, the Senate had not fully abandoned its previous efforts 
to protect property holding. British subjects still had a year to return to 
Maryland to reclaim their property and voting rights, although the state 
would not make any efforts to notify them of their deadlines. In addition, 
American creditors of British subjects would receive their debts before the 
state could make use of the properties. The law was vague on this point, 
however, noting that “the indemnification of sufferers shall be settled by 
the general assembly, and if agreed to is not to exceed the value of British 
property made use of by this state.” Despite bowing to the circumstances of 
the war, and despite the radical reformulation of the state’s relationship with 
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Britain and its own citizens, the Senate remained committed to upholding 
property rights and the rights of creditors.32
executing the confiscations
In 1781 Maryland established a three-man commission to oversee the con-
fiscations, appointing Colonel Uriah Forrest, William Paca, and Clement 
Hollyday as the first three commissioners. Forrest and Paca quickly resigned 
and were replaced by Gabriel Duvall and Colonel Nathaniel Ramsey. Except 
for Hollyday, all the commissioners were well-known figures in Maryland 
politics. Forrest left military service in 1781 and occupied a seat in Maryland’s 
House that year, eventually serving on both the state Senate and Executive 
Council. Paca was a legislator in both Maryland’s House and Senate and 
became governor in 1782. In addition to his military service, Ramsey was a 
delegate to the state’s conventions in 1775 and later elected to the legislature 
in 1789. Duvall served as the clerk for many of the state’s conventions, the 
state Council of Safety, and the House of Delegates. In 1782 he joined the 
Executive Council, forcing him to temporarily resign from the commission, 
although he soon returned and continued to conduct commission business 
until 1785. The less prominent Hollyday relocated to Annapolis to focus on 
dispatching the commission’s business full-time. Meanwhile, over the next 
few years the legislature began to enact a series of updated laws to further 
regulate confiscations, including a provision to enable tenants pre-emptive 
rights to buy the land that they had leased in the colonial period at slightly 
reduced rates.33
Beginning in 1782 Maryland appointed its intendant of the revenue, 
Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, to oversee the state’s funds. He began work-
ing closely with the commissioners of confiscated property and began 
directing many of the confiscations himself in 1784. By this time, the com-
mission had already auctioned off much of the British property, although 
numerous headaches remained for Jenifer to address. Foremost among 
these were many purchasers who had failed to pay in full had also failed 
to post bond on their remaining balances. By 1785 Maryland had entered 
a recession, putting enormous pressure on Jenifer, who was left with the 
unenviable task of handling the budget for a state that had spent profli-
gately for the last decade. This led to considerable tension between Jenifer 
and the commissioners.34
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Despite having a difficult job, the commissioners accomplished the confis-
cations with relatively little scandal. At a typical confiscation, commissioners 
had to assess an estate’s assets and determine the extent to which creditors 
should receive the proceeds of sales before the state. They would also over-
see surveys of properties and advertise and conduct auctions. A variety of 
problems could interfere with the speedy execution of confiscations. Rival 
claimants could protest sales, claiming ownership over confiscated property. 
In some instances, tenants who occupied confiscated lands refused to vacate 
them upon sale; in another example, French soldiers commandeered confis-
cated lands, making them temporarily useless to the purchaser who therefore 
refused to pay for them. Purchasers tried to return unwanted lands or bargain 
their way out of making a proportion of their down payments in specie. Soon 
after the sales began in 1782, the intendant of the revenue requested the post-
ponement of sales until enough specie was available at large for the public to 
make proper down payments at auction.35
The best insight into the difficulties the commission underwent comes 
from an extended, ugly exchange that took place from October 1786 to June 
1787 between the commissioners and the intendant of the revenue, Daniel 
of St. Thomas Jenifer. Once again, long after the principal business of con-
fiscation was over, the issue dominated the Maryland Gazette’s front pages, 
as the two groups sent accusatory letters to one another through the press. 
These began with Gabriel Duvall responding angrily to an earlier letter then 
circulating in Cecil County in which Jenifer claimed that the commissioners 
had attempted to remove him from his position as intendant and had tried 
to avoid his examination of their records. Several allegations of improper 
behavior stood out although criminal charges were never in question. Jenifer 
accused the commissioners of mishandling various surveys, auctions, and 
bonds, which resulted in the defrauding of purchasers and the state to the 
benefit of the commissioners. Duvall and the other commissioners denied 
this, arguing that their auctions raised particularly high prices for the land 
in question, especially in comparison to the sales Jenifer oversaw, and that 
any irregularities were due to the dire need to raise quick funds for the 
government.36
Particular confusion beset the early sales at Nanticoke Manor on the 
Eastern Shore. The commissioners had concentrated on the Western Shore, 
where most confiscations took place, leaving Nanticoke unsurveyed before 
auctioning off its lands. Numerous purchasers (including the commissioner 
Clement Hollyday) demanded their money back after the surveys, upon 
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receiving lands they had not intended to buy. As intendant, Jenifer ordered 
general resales at Nanticoke. The commissioners claimed that many of those 
demanding their money back merely had buyer’s remorse for paying high 
prices at the initial auction. As a result, the commissioners expected to be 
paid their 2.5 percent commission on both the initial sales and the resales. 
This question of commissions became a key aspect of the conflict between 
the intendant and the commissioners. Jenifer resented the commissioners’ 
high payments, especially given that he received the lesser commission of 
1.5 percent on sales that he conducted. He felt that the state overvalued the 
commissioners’ work. Instead, they should have always received payment in 
devalued paper money rather than specie, given their high commissions.37
The public letters revealed a variety of other irregular practices, which 
did not rise to the level of criminal fraud but point to the opportunity for 
official corruption inherent in confiscations. At public auctions, the com-
missioners should have demanded bonds of the successful bidders so that 
the state would be guaranteed payment. Otherwise, commissioners might 
receive commissions on sales for which the state would not receive full pay-
ment. They were often incapable of making buyers post bonds, while Jenifer 
had much less trouble once he took over the remainder of the sales in 1784. 
In a variety of cases the intendant ordered private sales, rather than auctions, 
for confiscated estates. Duvall alleged that some of these private sales raised 
far less money than an auction would have, meaning that well-placed friends 
of Jenifer could benefit at the state’s expense. Defending the commission-
ers, Duvall argued that Jenifer was able to enforce bonds because his sales 
brought in so little money for the state: “When a man can purchase property 
for an half, a fourth, or a tenth of its real value, he will not hesitate to comply 
with the terms of sale.” Nonetheless, neither Jenifer nor Duvall could present 
a convincing public case that any buyers received lands at cut rates.38
On at least one occasion, Commissioner Ramsey subverted a regulation 
that was meant to avoid the auctions being manipulated for the commission-
ers’ benefit. He used an undeclared proxy buyer to purchase lands for himself, 
to avoid an early injunction (which was later relaxed) against commissioners 
purchasing lands directly. In another instance, an alleged purchaser of lands, 
Stephen Steward, denied having ever bid for certain lots, suggesting that the 
commissioners were trying to receive commissions on lands for which the 
government would receive no payment. These allegations were troubling 
but did not rise to the level of involving either the legislature or the criminal 
justice system. The general pattern of sales and the accusations of the officials 
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involved suggest that the process of confiscation was inherently messy, espe-
cially given the state’s dire financial situation, which put pressure on officials 
to make quick sales.39
While outright corruption was not prevalent, the Maryland government 
executed confiscation in a way that reflected its elitism. Maryland sold over 
200,000 acres owned by loyalists for nearly half a million pounds, breaking 
up a variety of large estates in the process. Philip Crowl sought to test the 
widely held proposition that these confiscations tended to democratically 
redistribute property. This idea rested in part on the assumption that former 
tenants took advantage of laws allowing them to purchase the lands con-
fiscated from their landlords, the loyalist manor holders. Crowl found that 
the actual sale of loyalist properties produced mixed results: in places like 
Baltimore, where property values were high, and the properties sold were 
often merchants’ wharfs and warehouses, only the well-to-do could afford to 
buy much property. In the countryside the distribution of lands was more 
equitable, averaging 184 acres per purchase. Crowl argued that these sales did 
result in a more democratic distribution of the land, even if relatively few 
purchasers benefitted, because the sales broke up very large estates. However, 
these average purchases still dwarfed the fifty-acre titles that the government 
granted in Washington County to veterans (which would guarantee voting 
rights).40
Jackson Turner Main investigated the social effects of property confisca-
tion, generally concurring with Crowl’s observations. He pointed out that 
merchants, lawyers, and several prominent legislators, including Samuel 
Chase, Luther Martin, Daniel Carroll, and William Paca, purchased much 
of the valuable property sold in Baltimore. Main further noted that few ten-
ants on proprietary lands could afford to buy the lands where they lived, 
despite laws allowing them to buy it at a 10 percent price reduction. Main 
suggested that a real democratization in land holding primarily occurred 
after the initial speculators defaulted on their payments or sold the land they 
purchased at auction. However, Gregory Stiverson’s examination of tenants’ 
fates contrasted with Main’s findings. Looking at a variety of proprietary 
manorial estates in which tenants held cheap long-term leases, he found 
that by the time patentees received quiet possession of confiscated lands, 
they held more acreage on average than the tenants had. In the case of one 
estate in Queen Anne’s County, patentees held average farms of nearly 360 
acres in size, whereas tenants had farmed on average holdings of 113 acres. 
There, Commissioner Gabriel Duvall was particularly active as a speculator, 
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purchasing eight lots for himself and his business associates. He resold those 
lots within two years, in some cases to former tenants. Only in some lands of 
poor quality on the western shore were tenants able to buy their own lands 
directly after confiscation. For the rest, confiscation amounted to a destabi-
lization of their lives.41
A detailed analysis of Maryland’s sales of confiscated property shows that 
government officials, especially legislators, on average bought substantially 
larger amounts of property than other civilians did. In total, 785 separate 
buyers made valid purchases of confiscated property from 1781 to 1784, the 
period affected by the original confiscation law of early 1781. Of these, 68 
percent were neither military officers nor legislators, while 21 percent were 
military officers during the revolution, 3 percent were politicians during the 
colonial or early national era, and a further 7 percent were both officers and 
politicians.42
Although nonofficials accounted for nearly 70 percent of the purchasers, 
their purchases were far smaller than those by officials. On average, nonof-
ficials bought £424 of property per purchaser. Military officers bought twice 
that amount, at £843 of property per purchaser. Legislators bought nearly 
three times as much per purchaser, at £1,266 each, and men who were both 
officers and legislators bought roughly five and a half times as much property 
as nonofficials, at an average of £2,330 per purchaser. A similar pattern held 
for other types of confiscated property. For example, although nonofficials 
bought 184 rural acres per purchaser on average, military officers bought 
nearly twice as many, and politicians bought nearly three times as many acres 
as nonofficials. Officials also tended to finance other purchasers’ payments 
at much higher rates, paid greater amounts of interest, and bought more 
expensive urban property.
In general, nonofficials bought less than military officers, who bought less 
than politicians, while individuals who served as both officers and politicians 
bought the most confiscated property. Among the officers, militia offic-
ers tended to buy slightly less property than those who had served in the 
Continental Army, suggesting that Continental officers came from a higher 
stratum of society. These patterns mirror the distribution of officers within 
Maryland, with high property requirements making service in the legislature 
an exclusive club. In the Maryland militia soldiers elected their officers and 
occasionally elected men of lower status, including some who could not meet 
the property qualifications for voting. This may partially explain the discrep-
ancy in total purchases between militia and army officers.43
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The evidence also indicates that men who served in both the military 
and political fields tended to buy larger amounts of property. This suggests 
a correlation between office and opportunity, whereby wealthier men filled 
the positions of power in both the military and politics. It also suggests that 
men who tapped into multiple social networks cultivated greater opportuni-
ties for financial gain.
It is unreasonable to believe that Maryland’s legislators decided to con-
fiscate property based strictly out of self-interest. Norman K. Risjord noted 
that only 25 percent of Maryland’s legislators speculated in confiscated 
property, and less than 20 percent of Maryland’s legislators engaged in 
large-scale speculations during the 1780s. Many who did voted against their 
personal economic interests, opposing debt relief and easy credit. Legislators 
also made a token effort to benefit tenants on confiscated lands. However, 
Maryland’s elites controlled its government, so it should not surprise us that 
confiscations tended to put large properties in the hands of those elites. 
Corruption in this case was not overt, but it was systemic: the wealthy were 
the men best positioned to benefit from any opportunity for investment or 
speculation and most likely to comprise the state’s leadership. Having gained 
control, Maryland’s leaders did not conduct the revolution to level social 
differences: they sought to protect private property whenever possible and 
had little interest in democratizing wealth beyond the necessity of avoiding 
popular revolt.44
placing maryland’s confiscations in context
Pennsylvania’s and Maryland’s confiscations make for a strong comparative 
case study. While both were proprietary colonies, they had significant dif-
ferences in their economies, the radicalness of their early politics, and the 
degree to which the British and loyalists harassed revolutionaries during 
the war. They also differed in the amount of western land they retained 
after the revolution: Pennsylvania still had access to millions of acres of the 
backcountry, while Maryland did not. Despite these differences, both states 
ultimately endorsed confiscation as a means for raising money and, in both 
states, prominent men came to dominate those purchases.
As the revolution began, Pennsylvania and Maryland took alternate politi-
cal trajectories. Pennsylvania produced the most radical constitution of any 
rebelling state. Colonial Pennsylvania had required voters to possess fifty 
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acres of land or £50 of cash. Pennsylvania’s revolutionary constitution of 
1776 did away with this barrier to voting: instead, a white man could vote 
if he was twenty-one or older, had lived in Pennsylvania for at least a year, 
and had paid taxes during that time. This meant that perhaps 90 percent 
of Philadelphians and 75 percent of men in the countryside could vote, an 
increase over the percentage of the populace that would have met the colo-
nial property requirements, which might have been as low as 50 percent. In 
addition, the constitution created a single-chamber legislature whose mem-
bers could not serve consecutive years, a president without veto power, and 
a Council of Censors to review the government’s operation. To encourage 
public feedback, the government published bills before passing them, pledg-
ing not to propose and pass bills in the same session, so that the people could 
consider them first. To encourage financial equality, the government passed 
progressive taxes, penalizing land speculators.45
Both Pennsylvania’s radical government and its military situation differen-
tiated it from Maryland. After the fall of New York in 1776, British general 
William Howe turned his attention to Philadelphia, eventually capturing 
the city in September 1777. The Continental Congress evacuated the city, 
fleeing into the backcountry to Lancaster and eventually York. While a size-
able number of potential loyalist activists stood ready to help the British, the 
regular army made little effort to arm them and soon evacuated the city in 
June 1778. While Maryland enjoyed relative safety, Pennsylvania remained in 
upheaval for years.46
Given the tumult that came with this occupation, the Pennsylvania 
legislature was quick to pass laws to condemn loyalists for treason. These 
laws soon gave way to acts of confiscation. In 1776 the Pennsylvania state 
constitutional convention passed an ordinance allowing property confis-
cations for treason. However, because the convention had no legislative 
authority, no loyalists forfeited property under this ordinance. In February 
1777 the Pennsylvania legislature passed a law allowing confiscation of move-
able property as punishment for treason. While Howe campaigned around 
Philadelphia later in 1777, previously passive loyalists began to demonstrate 
their support for the British. In response, a branch of the Pennsylvania 
Assembly, the Council of Safety, began authorizing confiscations and sales of 
loyalist property (including real estate) without trial in February 1778, almost 
three years before Maryland. The state sold about a dozen properties in this 
manner, mostly in the patriot-controlled backcountry. In March 1778, with 
the British in occupation of Philadelphia, the legislature officially allowed the 
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confiscation of real estate, specifically targeting thirteen notorious loyalists 
for treason trials. Legislators primarily aimed this law at loyalists who had left 
the state. Selling their property would alleviate the state’s tax burden. These 
sales coincided with treason trials, which began after the British abandon-
ment of Philadelphia.47
Pennsylvanians who failed to report to treason trials received a mandatory 
death sentence, although in practice few executions occurred. In all, the state 
accused about 500 hundred citizens of treason. Of the 113 who reported for 
their trials, only 17 underwent an actual trial. Of these, only 2 were convicted 
and executed, forfeiting their property. The state also confiscated the prop-
erty of 118 other loyalists who refused to report for trial, thus intertwining 
confiscation with treason. Land sales began in August 1779 and continued 
slowly for many years. The state used the money to shore up its finances, 
allotting some of the proceeds from the sale specifically to fund the university 
in Philadelphia and recompense soldiers whom the state had paid in depreci-
ated currency.48
Because the end of the war was economically turbulent, many 
Pennsylvanians sought to cheat the state through the process of acquiring 
confiscated lands. Pennsylvanians’ dishonest dealings resembled those in 
Maryland but took place on a grander scale. For example, in 1780 the state 
reconfiscated lands sold to purchasers in Northampton County. Taking 
advantage of the rapid depreciation of the currency, purchasers there sought 
to delay payment for their lands to gain the lands at a lower real price. In 
Bucks County accusations of intimidation at auctions emerged, indicating 
that prices could be kept low to benefit buyers at the expense of the state. 
Throughout the state, officials made little effort to meticulously record 
property sales, and much of the land appears to have fallen into the hands of 
a small number of well-connected men. In 1780 the government prosecuted 
Thomas Hale, the agent overseeing land confiscations in Philadelphia 
County, for fraud. His books showed a shortfall of £50,000.49
Wealthy Pennsylvanians, including prominent merchants, speculated in 
depreciation certificates, which could be used to purchase confiscated lands. 
The state government had originally issued these certificates to soldiers who 
had received depreciated pay as a means to guarantee them a fair form of 
compensation. Using the certificates, speculators might purchase lands under 
assumed names. For example, in 1786 in Bucks County, Nicolas Brosius 
bought property using the depreciation certificates issued to thirty different 
soldiers. In other examples, state officials overseeing land sales took part in 
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the bidding. Of 196 buyers, 52 were army officers, 4 were legislators, and 1 
was the Chief Justice of Pennsylvania, Thomas McKean. An additional 17 
purchasers worked for the state bureaucracy in some capacity, most having 
something to do with overseeing state funds or the forfeited estates.50
Throughout the 1780s Pennsylvania’s confiscated estates remained a politi-
cal football. In October 1780 conservative Republicans won state elections 
in Pennsylvania, forcing through a bill to settle soldiers’ pay. In part, the 
government would produce the money through sales of confiscated lands. 
Radicals opposed the bill, including the allocations of sales from confiscated 
lands, fearing that a well-paid army might come to dominate political affairs. 
However, radicals certainly did not want to put a stop to the land sales: they 
also accused conservatives of wanting to return the Penn family to the state 
and restore confiscated property to returning loyalists. In another example, 
the state’s Council of Censors set aside forty-five confiscated estates for the 
old College of Philadelphia. Disliking the direction of the college, which had 
been taken over by the radical state assembly in 1779, and arguing that the 
college received more income from the confiscated properties than expected, 
conservative Republicans in the legislature chose to allow only two-thirds of 
these reserved estates as endowments for the college in 1784. The next year, 
when radical constitutionalists regained political control, they reassigned these 
estates to the college. In the late 1780s conservative Republicans campaigned 
in part on the position that radicals had squandered the state’s confiscated 
property. However, when conservatives ultimately came to power in 1790, 
the confiscations were no longer a hot-button issue. Pennsylvania’s political 
oscillations stood in contrast to Maryland, where the more stable power of 
conservatives like Charles Carroll of Carrollton had delayed confiscation for 
years but also eliminated backtracking after the initiation of the policy.51
New Jersey’s overtly corrupt confiscations resembled those in Pennsylvania. 
The war raged in that state early, and confiscations began there in August 
1777. New Jersey’s commissioners took particular advantage of the chaos 
caused by the war. Because the currency was in a state of freefall, the commis-
sioners held on to the specie they received personally, delaying their payments 
to the state, effectively paying in dollars worth far less than they received. 
In Governor Livingston’s words, they “plundered us of thousands by trad-
ing with the money, or converting it into real estate, and afterwards paying 
us at a great depreciation.” The state’s attorney general, William Paterson, 
estimated the commissioners’ dishonesty cost New Jersey $300,000. In other 
cases commissioners manipulated auctions to secure sales for their friends, 
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either by limiting bidding or by holding sales very early in the day. Elsewhere, 
local loyalists would arrange for friendly transfers of property to their patriot 
neighbors, thereby avoiding confiscation altogether. In 1781, the year that 
Maryland’s confiscations began, New Jersey’s governor halted land sales, argu-
ing that the state’s commissioners had defrauded the public. As elsewhere, the 
process of auctions did not break up big estates to make way for smallholders. 
Tenants received no pre-emption rights to buy the lands where they lived. 
Wealthy men purchased much of the confiscated land cheaply.52
This pattern, in which the wealthy benefited and confiscations had 
little social impact, held in most places throughout the United States. In 
Massachusetts the proceeds from confiscations in Suffolk County went 
primarily to private creditors to whom loyalists had owed debts. Because 
sales had to be paid in cash, which was scarce, many men could not 
participate in the sales, which caused grumbling among soldiers paid in 
certificates. The confiscated lands themselves went primarily to men who 
already owned land. In Virginia most of the 53,000 confiscated acres sold 
had previously belonged to British merchants; those acres passed primar-
ily into the hands of the gentry. Similarly, in Georgia, confiscation did 
not significantly redistribute landholdings, and the Georgia government 
sought to forgive several prominent loyalists in the hopes of improving the 
postwar economy.53
Regarding redistribution, war-torn New York stood apart from other 
states. In colonial New York enormous estates were common and ten-
ancy was endemic. Drawing on the social conflicts that predated the 
revolution, confiscations broke up loyalist manors to the benefit of their 
pro-revolutionary tenants, causing a democratization of landholding. For 
example, in Philipse Manor, confiscation broke up a single 50,000-acre estate 
into 287 landholdings; 194 of the new owners had previously been tenants. 
John T. Reilly estimated that more than 70 percent of the purchasers of 
confiscated lands came from the lower classes and “that between one-quarter 
and one-third of the state’s one million improved acres changed hands in the 
direction of a wider distribution of landownership.” Confiscations, along 
with generous redistributions of moveable property to the needy, cemented 
revolutionary support in New York as a whole and tended to level society in 
a way that they did not elsewhere. However, even in New York, land policy 
still reflected the state’s hierarchical power structure. As one might expect, 
many speculators purchased confiscated estates alongside tenants, and 
large estates held by patriots were not broken up for similar redistribution. 
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By 1784 desirous of speculators’ money to raise funds, the state removed its 
500-acre limit on land purchases, thereby reversing its democratic approach
to confiscated land.54
A few generalizations unite Maryland’s experience of confiscation with that 
of other states. Despite sporadic political opposition, the need for confisca-
tion became apparent across the United States. Corruption attended all of the 
confiscations, but its scale varied with time. States under greater duress tended 
to embrace confiscation more rapidly, and their confiscations coincided with 
extreme inflation, exacerbating the opportunities for corruption. This was par-
ticularly the case in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Elsewhere, such as in New 
York, or on a very small scale in Maryland, states sought to directly benefit 
impoverished patriotic tenants. Usually, politicians subordinated support for 
the poor to the need to acquire cash quickly and the direct beneficiaries of con-
fiscations were wealthy creditors and speculators. However, the scale of these 
speculations would soon be dwarfed by the land dealings of the late 1780s and 
1790s. Once the barriers to trans-Appalachian settlement opened after the war, 
a variety of grand speculators and land companies purchased millions of acres 
at a time, leaving many common farmers landless. In Pennsylvania speculators 
came to control perhaps 80 percent of the backcountry lands opened after the 
revolution. Further south, most settlers that moved into southwestern Virginia 
and Kentucky during the 1790s remained landless. The speculation in confis-
cated estates presaged how much the post-revolutionary land market would tip 
in favor of speculators but did so on a far smaller scale.55
It is indeed worth noting that small states without western land, like 
Maryland and New Jersey, turned to confiscation with relative avidity. During 
the revolution, states like Georgia, which made relatively modest confisca-
tions, still claimed immense lands in the west. Although it did not claim 
lands in the far west, Pennsylvania could claim millions of trans-Appalachian 
acres that could be put on sale following the war. Its officials chose not to 
bother with casting a wider net for loyalist properties that would be unlikely 
to sell quickly at auction. As a result, most of Pennsylvania’s confiscated lands 
lay in Philadelphia County, where land prices remained highest. In contrast, 
by the time of the revolution, Maryland had all but exhausted its supply of 
land. Lacking any obvious means of raising revenue quickly, once the state 
government decided to authorize confiscations, it needed to press for the 
sales of as many loyalist properties as possible. This could account for why 
Maryland sold around 150,000 more acres of confiscated land than its larger 
neighbors, Pennsylvania and Virginia.56
PAH 86.4_02_Gallo.indd Page 500 27/08/19  11:52 AM PAH 86.4_02_Gallo.indd Page 501 27/08/19  11:52 AM
As expected, when the Revolutionary War ended, Britain’s peace agree-
ment with the United States stipulated that the Americans should return the 
loyalists’ confiscated property. Nevertheless, only a small minority, includ-
ing a number of wives and family members who petitioned for relief, ever 
received any of their property back. In the colonies as a whole, about 60,000 
loyalists fled the mainland. Of these, more than 5,000 filed statements with 
the British government respecting lost property. Of those people, a little over 
2,000 received payment from the British government, totaling approximately 
30 percent of their estimated property losses.57
Once the crisis of the war ended, the nation’s political leaders came to 
regret revolutionary-era confiscations, enshrining a ban on bills of attainder 
in section 9 of Article I of the Constitution. In the mid-1780s a sea change 
occurred: whereas every state had seen property confiscation as desirable, the 
country now considered it unconstitutional, much as Charles Carroll and his 
fellow Maryland senators once did. This raises the question of what confisca-
tion meant to citizenship during the revolutionary period. In 1788 individual 
property rights had to be respected: why not before? Whereas Maryland, 
and the English-speaking world, had always tied subjecthood to property 
ownership, the chaos of the revolution made that position untenable, at least 
temporarily. If confiscation were to be constitutional, subjects had to become 
citizens: voluntary adherents to the revolutionary cause. Maryland’s senators 
came to this position out of financial exigency and practical necessity; British 
confiscations of American traitors’ property gave them no choice. Beyond 
this, confiscation had offered the possibility of radically redistributing wealth 
in the country. The Maryland government did not consider this possibility: 
it was not politically necessary (in contrast with New York) and Maryland’s 
elites had always worried about the threat of mob rule. Indeed, as Carroll 
had predicted, the confiscated lands ended up in the hands of “engrossers 
and speculators.” In many cases these were the same men who led the state 
in revolution. This outcome should not surprise us: Maryland’s elites had 
already arranged its state constitution to ensure that control of both houses 
of the legislature were in the hands of the men who had the wherewithal to 
speculate during the revolutionary crisis.58
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